Abstract: From seemingly outdated passages of Aristotle on oikonomikè, this paper tries to select and separate what is old-fashioned from what is valid for today. From these latter elements—which may be abridged in the intrinsic ethical and political character of economics—we can extract useful lessons. These lessons refer to the impact of Ethics and Politics on Economics. They stress the relevance of personal virtues and institutions for a suitable functioning of the economy. From an epistemological point of view, these lessons highlight the inexact character of Economics and the necessity of firm reliance on data. Current economics does not deal with ends, but only with means. The Aristotelian perspective would specially deal with ends. This concern with ends leads to prudential, not technical analysis and decisions. This calls for broadening the scope of Economics and consequently should provoke changes in its instruction. The paper concludes that a closer attention to Aristotle’s thought would have a high impact on current economy and Economics.

Key words: Aristotle, economy, practical science

Resumen: En este artículo se separan los elementos anacrónicos de otros perennes, válidos para hoy día, de los pasajes aristotélicos acerca de la oikonomikè. Podemos extraer lecciones útiles de estos últimos elementos. Éstos pueden resumirse en el carácter intrínsecamente ético y político de la economía para Aristóteles. Estas enseñanzas enfatizan la relevancia de las virtudes personales y de las instituciones para...
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un buen funcionamiento de la economía. Desde un punto de vista epistemológico, destacan el carácter inexacto de la economía y la necesidad de una base firme en datos reales. La economía actual es agnóstica en relación a los fines; sólo se preocupa de los medios. La perspectiva aristotélica, en cambio, se ocupa especialmente de los fines. Este envolvimiento con los fines conduce a decisiones y análisis más prudentes que técnicos, lo que implica una dilatación del ámbito de interés de la economía y los consiguientes cambios en su enseñanza. El trabajo concluye que una atención al pensamiento aristotélico sobre la economía causaría un alto impacto tanto en la actividad económica como en su ciencia.

Palabras claves: Aristóteles, economía, ciencia práctica.

As I was educated in a Department of Economics with philosophical concerns and in a Department of Philosophy with a strong Aristotelian mark, Aristotle has been most present in my research in the field of philosophy of economics. My interest in delving into Aristotelian thinking about the economy has not been, however, a matter of archaeological concern. I have found in Aristotle what I consider smart insights and contributions for contemporary Economics.

This alleged relevance of Aristotle for our times can be approached from two points of view expressed in these two questions:

1. Is Aristotle present in today’s Economics? This question entails an analysis of the influence of Aristotle on some relevant authors.

2. What could current economists learn from him? This question calls for a normative answer: what could Aristotle add to Economics, or how could his ideas help to overcome the deficiencies of contemporary Economics.

In respect to the first question, I have worked on the presence of Aristotle in Marx, the Austrians and specifically Menger, in Amartya Sen and in Nancy Cartwright in some papers2 (and

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2 “¿Fue Aristóteles marxista en economía? (Valoración crítica de la posición de Scott Meikle)”, in Philosophia, 2005, pp. 41-54. (“Was Aristotle
there is extensive bibliography on this). Here I will not revisit these issues.

In respect to the second question, a complete answer supposes an exposition of an ontological analysis of ‘the economic’ according to Aristotle,\(^3\) of his notion of economics as science,\(^4\) and of his possible teachings about the relationship between economics, on the one hand, and epistemology, ethics and politics, on the other hand.\(^5\)

In this paper I aim to combine a written summary of the answers that I have offered to this second question in those scattered papers. To maintain a sensible length of the paper, I selected the most relevant topics. The book \textit{La economía como ciencia moral} contains a longer, though incomplete, exposition of which other scholars have done more extensive work.\(^6\) Among them, I consider the best book to be by Scott Meikle,\(^7\) although


\(^{7}\) Meikle, Scott, 1995. \textit{Aristotle’s Economic Thought}, Oxford University
I have criticized it for its Marxist perspective. With this summary, I expect to provide a helpful service those concerned with Aristotle’s contribution to current economics.

1. **Aristotle on “the economic” ontology, what is Aristotle’s oikonomikè?**

   In his *Lives of the Philosophers*, Diogenes Laertius depicts an outline of Aristotle’s life and work, characterizing him as a morally upright person. Diogenes transcribes Aristotle’s testament where he expressed his last will in a detailed manner, caring of his relatives, and freeing his slaves. This worry about all of them reflects the non ethereal nature of his practical philosophy, firmly rooted and embedded in matter and time. Diogenes writes of Aristotle’s teachings that “virtue was not sufficient of itself to confer happiness; for that it had also need of the goods of the body, and of the external goods.” Hence, we should look after not only virtue but also these goods. According to Aristotle as quoted by Diogenes, “things which are ethical (…) concerning politics, and economy, and laws.” In effect, Aristotle conceived Economics as one of the practical sciences (*epistèmè praktikè*), which were the ethical sciences. For him, the highest practical science was Politics, to which Economics, as the other practical sciences, was subordinated.

   Strictly speaking, however, I have to clarify a point: Aristotle’s concept of “the economic” differs from Economics – Aristotle uses the term *oikonomikè*, here translated as “the economic”. At the beginning of an article on the Aristotelian notion of economy, Christian Rutten notes:

   “Firstly, “the economic” of Aristotle does not correspond at all with what in our times is called the economy. Secondly, this does not mean that we do not find in Aristotle (…) developments about the economic reality in the current today sense.

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8 In Crespo 2005, op. cit. (and see also footnote 16 in this paper).
Thirdly, this does not mean in advance that there is no relationship, in Aristotle’s thought, between “the economic”, on the one hand, and production, distribution and consumption of material goods, on the other hand.”

Although Aristotle was not an economist, he stated seminal concepts that originate basic ideas about Economics and its relationship with Ethics and Politics. We must first untie a terminological knot corresponding to Aristotle’s concept of “the economic”. Then, once untied, a rich conception of Economics will emerge. Thus, the relevance for this research of Aristotle’s thought stems from the attempt to update this thought, “actualizing” its hidden “potency”.

In effect, if one reads the economic passages of the Politics (specially Book I, Chapters 3-13) and of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (in particular Book V, Chapter 5) without special attention, one may overlook the richness hidden in an apparently naive exposition of the ways of managing the household, including the members of the family, the slaves and the material possessions. However, if one makes an effort to put aside the old-fashioned and outdated elements of these passages, relevant concepts and teachings for the present days can be discovered. Here I will leave out the relationship between the husband-father-master and the other members of the household, and I will concentrate on what is of interest to us, the relationship with the possessions.

In reference to this last sense, most historians of economic thought correctly translate oikonomikè as ‘household management’. This translation indirectly marginalizes Aristotle’s contribution to economic analysis. Aristotle, however, held that oikonomikè (‘the economic’) and its related technique, chrematistics, referred not only to the house but also to the *polis*. Chrematistics “is a form of acquisition which the manager of a household must either find ready to hand, or himself provide and arrange, because it ensures a supply of objects, necessary for life and useful to the association of the polis or the

household”.

Some authors have interpreted that chrematistics is a technique which serves both oikonomikè and politikè. Given that the former deals with the house and the latter with the polis, they consider that “political economy” would be a contradiction in terms for Aristotle. However, in my opinion, regardless of the terms adopted, these authors stress something that could be left aside given that the criteria proposed by Aristotle for using properties in the house and in the polis are the same.

Besides, if “the economic” is merely household management, where do we find current Political Economy in the Aristotelian system? Chrematistics is not the right place to look because it would correspond to contemporary production, commerce and finances. In the Aristotelian thought the tasks of Political Economy are included in Politics, and not only regarding those actions concerning the “necessary” or the “useful” for the polis, but also the activities of “the economic” related to the polis performed by the owner of the house. This would then be an enlarged re-elaborated notion of “the economic” according to Aristotle. It deals not only with the house, the life and necessity, but also with the polis, with what is useful and free, and thus moral, and with the good life and happiness. I consider, then, that the terminological knot is untangled and, thus, here I will integrate in the term oikonomikè the use of wealth regarding the household as well as the civil community.

Oikonomikè is the Greek adjective usually used by Aristotle to refer to anything related to the use of wealth in order to achieve the Good Life. He does not use it with corresponding nouns. Thus, it is in fact a substantivated adjective. What is the meaning of this ‘the economic’? What kind of reality is it? I have sustained that it is an analogical or “homonymous pròs...

hén” term. To argue for this I will turn both to explicit quotations of Aristotle and to the application of other elements of his system to this topic. Homonymous prós hén terms have different though related meanings, one of which is the “focal” or primary meaning to which the other, derivative meanings, refer and are connected. What are these different meanings?

1.1. A human action:

Let us begin with the focal meaning. It is likely that the focal meaning of ‘the economic’ for Aristotle will be found precisely in his definition of the economic. We will confirm this hypothesis when we compare it with other entities he also calls “economic”. As already explained, Aristotle sets the definition of oikonomikè by comparing it to chrematistikè. Oikonomikè is the use of wealth, while chrematistikè is the acquisition of wealth. “To use” is a human action, the action of using wealth. In the Nicomachean Ethics he affirms that the end of oikonomikè is wealth. However, the object of use of oikonomikè does not suggest unlimited wealth, but the wealth necessary to live at all (zên) and to live well (eû zên).

14 I decided to use the expression “homonymy prós hén” (that is, “homonymia ad unum” or “homonymous in relation with one thing”), to clearly distinguish this concrete use of the term homonymy by Aristotle from other ways in which he himself uses it. It would lead us too far from the objective of this research to describe those different uses and to completely justify this decision. I am following Joseph Moreau’s suggestion (Moreau, Joseph, Aristote et son école, PUF, Paris, 1962: 83). The expression “focal meaning” was felicitously coined by G. E. L. Owen in “Logic and Metaphysics in some Earlier Works of Aristotle”, in I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August 1957, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothenburgensia, XI, 1960, Göteborg, pp. 163-90.
16 Cf. Politics I, 4, 1253b 24-5.
Furthermore, Aristotle also considers chrematistics as human action: a technique that ought to be subordinated to oikonomikè, dealing, as said, with the acquisition of things used by oikonomikè. However, he distinguishes between two kinds of chrematistics: one actually subordinated to oikonomikè, limited and natural, and another unnatural in that it is actually not subordinated to oikonomikè and looks unlimitedly for money. Concerning the latter he affirms: “this second form [leads] to the opinion that there is no limit to wealth and property.”\(^\text{17}\) He calls it “justly censured.”\(^\text{18}\)

Thus, completing the definition, for Aristotle, oikonomikè is the action of using the things that are necessary for life (live at all) and for the Good Life (live well). When Aristotle speaks about “life at all” he is referring to what is achieved at home (oikos). When he talks about the Good Life he is referring to what is attainable in the polis, and it is the end of the civil community. According to him, the latter concept of life has a precise moral meaning; it is a life of virtues by which humans achieve happiness.

What kind of action is ‘the economic’? In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of human actions. Firstly, immanent actions, that is, actions whose end is the action itself such as seeing, thinking or living. The results of immanent actions remain in the agent. Secondly, transitive actions where the “result is something apart from the exercise, (and thus) the actuality is in the thing that is being made.”\(^\text{19}\) Transitive actions are actions the results of which transcend the agent and are something different from the agent, as in a product. Aristotle calls immanent action prâxis and transitive action poïesis.\(^\text{20}\) All actions are both immanent and transitive except in the case of a fully immanent action (to think, to love). For example, when somebody works, there are two results, an ‘objective’ result, such as the product or service (transitive), and a ‘subjective’ result

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\(^\text{17}\) *Politics* I, 9, 1257a 1.
\(^\text{18}\) *Politics* I, 10, 1258b 1.
\(^\text{19}\) *Metaphysics* IX, 8, 1050a 30-1.
\(^\text{20}\) Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, 4, 1140a 1.
such as the increase in ability or the self-fulfilment of the agent as well as the morality of the act (immanent). For Aristotle, this latter—the immanent aspect—is the most relevant. It is the one sought for its own sake, not for any subsequent end. Aristotle says, “we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more complete than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else.”21 That is, Aristotle attributes more relevance to the intrinsic or immanent aspect of action—that which is in itself worthy of pursuit—because it is the aspect whose end is the very fulfilment or perfection of the agent. For him the external aspect of action is simply instrumental.

Oikonomikè is the action of using, in Greek, chresasthai. What kind of action, immanent or transitive, is chresasthai? “To use” is a transitive action insofar as the thing used is consumed or wasted when used. However, the complete action of oikonomikè is to use what is necessary to satisfy the agent’s requirements to live well: this is the immanent consideration of use because it is using for the sake of the proper perfection, while the action of chrematistikè is clearly transitive.22 This concrete characterization of economic action was not developed by Aristotle; however, I consider that it constitutes a genuine Aristotelian analysis ‘the economic’ human action.

Action belongs to the metaphysical category of action: Categories IX. Human action—praxis—is the most perfect ‘sublunar’ way of being of actuality or energeia.23 Humans try to achieve perfection through action. This is one reason why oikonomikè is a typically human entity. Previous activities needed to act—i.e., deliberation and choice—are qualities of the mind and the will. The use of wealth is a kind of human action. As

21 Nicomachean Ethics I, 7, 1097a 30-1.
22 Tô chresasthai is the ‘substantivation’ of the Greek verb chráo in its ‘middle voice’ infinitive aorist form. The middle voice has a reflexive use that is coherent with this possible predominant sense of prâxis of chresasthai. The French and Spanish translations show this characteristic: “se server” (French)/ “procurarse de,” “servirse de” (Spanish). Chresoméne, another form used by Aristotle to signify the action of oikonomikè is another form of chráo, a future middle participle that indicates finality.
previously mentioned, it has both an immanent and a transitive character. Human actions are voluntary and intentional. They do not only happen to humans, as if they were something alien and presupposed previous activities in the same person. Some of these activities are intellectual –knowledge, belief–, and others are volitional –will, choice and decision. Aristotle considers deliberation of mind (\textit{bouleúesthai}) and choice of will (\textit{proairesis}) as the previously required acts preceding action. Capacity, habit and science facilitate these previous steps. As explained, economic action is, for Aristotle, the action of using the things necessary to live and to live well (in a moral sense). I will add that it is a subjective action, because each person judges what is necessary for himself. This characteristic of ‘the economic’ reinforces its accidental character. That is, firstly, ‘the economic’ does not have a concrete determined content (i.e., it is contingent) and, secondly, it inheres in an accidental subject, i.e., human action.

1.2. A capacity

Aristotle says: “(…) and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this [Politics], for example, strategy, economics (\textit{oikonomikèn}), rhetoric.”\textsuperscript{24} That is, he also considers \textit{oikonomikè} as a capacity, that is, an ability, or power; in this case, a power to perform economic actions.\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Oikonomikè}

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, I, 2, 1094b 1-2.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Oikonomikè} being a capacity may explain why it is often translated as “an art of household management.” Jowett and Barker (Aristotle, \textit{Politics}, translated by Benjamin Jowett, Random House, New York, 1943) translate \textit{oikonomikè} in this way. Ross also speaks about the art of economics (\textit{Nicomachean Ethics} I, 1). However, this translation is not coherent: if \textit{oikonomikè} ‘uses’, whereas \textit{chrematistikè} ‘produces’, it is clear that the latter is an art or technique, but not the former, since an art indicates the habit of production (cf. \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} VI, 4), and \textit{oikonomikè} does not produce but uses. Gianni Vattimo (\textit{Il concetto di fare in Aristotele}, Torino, Università di Torino, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, 1961: 64 ff.) has shown that art – \textit{tēchne} – has two senses for Aristotle. The most employed is the one explained above. However, Aristotle also uses the term \textit{tēchne} as \textit{dynamis} – capacity or general principle of human
as capacity is a derived sense of oikonomikè, because the capacity of using exists for the sake of the action of using. Given that capacities are defined by their ends or functions, these ends are ontologically prior to the very capacities and correspond to the focal meaning in a case of an analogical term such as oikonomikè. “The excellence of a thing is relative to its proper function,” says Aristotle.

Capacity (dynamis), to have a power (“a source of movement or change”): it is a quality. Capacities, for Aristotle, are natural (physikes). A capacity is an ability, potentiality, power or talent possessed, in this case, by a human person. Human nature is equipped with some innate capacities that require development and with others that are acquired. Oikonomikè is one of these, probably innate but with broad possibilities for development. Some people have economic capacity whereas others do not. This characteristic of capacities reinforces their accidental character.

1.3. A habit

It seems reasonable that if oikonomikè is both an action and the capacity to perform this action, it also engenders a habit that facilitates it. For Aristotle, habits rely on natural dispositions and are propelled and reinforced by education and law. The very repetition of the action also consolidates the habit thus constituting a kind of virtuous circle: actions-habit-actions. It also makes sense to find that oikonomikè is a habit that facilitates the immanent aspect of action—not a technè—i.e. a habit of production. In effect, Aristotle speaks about household management as a kind of prudence, which in the Aristotelian conception mainly reinforces the immanent proficiency of the human actions— in the Physics and other workings. Thus oikonomikè is an art in the sense of capacity. Besides, the Greek suffix ‘ik’ means capacity.

27 Nicomachean Ethics VI, 2, 1139a 17.
28 Metaphysics V, 12, 1019a 15.
29 Cf. Categories VIII 9a 14ff.
being. Oikonomikè as a kind of habit is another derived sense of oikonomikè. The same argument set out above about oikonomikè as capacity being a derived meaning, applies in this case: the focal meaning, to which this derived meaning is oriented, is the proper object of the habit, that is, the corresponding action. Oikonomikè as a kind of habit helps the performance of oikonomikè as the action of using necessary things for living well. It is also clear that chrematistikè is a technique which is a habit of production for Aristotle.

As action and capacity, habit (héxis) is also ontologically a quality, a “having”. Habits are more lasting and stable qualities than dispositions. Virtue (areté) is a quality also belonging to the sub-type of habit. Virtues are built on a natural disposition through repetition of actions. A habit is an acquired behaviour pattern regularly followed until it has become almost involuntary, dominant or regular disposition or tendency.

Habits are fundamental to human life. We cannot leave everything always subject to decision becoming psychologically ill; we need habits in order to structure behaviour in daily life. Personality is shaped by acquiring habits through the repetition of acts. They constitute a person’s “second nature”. Given that habits are determined by actions and that actions are free, they may differ from person to person. Hence, habits are accidental and they are also contingent.

1.4. A science

This last sense of oikonomikè moves closer than the former to today’s meaning of the term economics: oikonomikè as science. At the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states that Politics:

“ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state (...) and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities fall under this, e.g., strategy, economics, rhetoric;

30 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics VI, 8; cf. also Eudemian Ethics I, 8, 1218b 13.
31 Cf. Politics I, 9 and 10, passim; e.g., 1257b 7.
33 Cf. Categories VIII 8b 34-5.
now since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man.”

There is even a terminological similarity between Politics (politike) and oikonomikè that is worth pointing out. Let us hear from Ernest Barker’s commentary on Aristotle’s Politics:

“‘Politics’ in the Greek is an adjectival form – as if we should say ‘the political’. What is the noun which it implies? Strictly, it is the noun ‘science’ (episteme). But sciences may be, in Aristotle’s view, practical as well as theoretical, and since the science of politics is largely practical, we may say that ‘the political’ implies the noun ‘art’ or ‘capacity’ (techne or dynamis) no less than it implies the noun ‘science’. In a word, it implies both. ‘Politics’ is the scientific study of the polis, and of all things political, with a view to political action or the proper exercise of the political ‘art’.”

As previously remarked, oikonomikè is a Greek adjective. Taking into account the whole context of the treatment of oikonomikè in the Politics, Aristotelian scholars have usually interpreted this passage in the sense of Economics as a practical science. As explained, Aristotle distinguishes among theoretical, practical and poietical (or technical) sciences. For him the subject of practical sciences is the immanent aspect of human actions and the subject of technical (or poietical) sciences is the transitive aspect of those human actions. Politics is the “most

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34 Politics I, 2, 1094b 4-6.
architectonical” Aristotelian practical science. Given that “the economic” action has a relevant immanent aspect, oikonomikè is also a practical science for Aristotle.

This last meaning of oikonomikè as practical science is analogical in respect to ‘economic’ human action. Although a practical science, science for Aristotle is quite different from action and from practical wisdom (prudence): “practical wisdom (phrónesis) cannot be science (epistéme).”

Ontologically, knowledge and science are habits which are a kind of quality. As a practical science ‘the economic’ is not exact: the truth of the practical is not fixed.

1.5. Some consequences stemming from the categorial analysis

All the entities qualified by the adjective oikonomikè –action, capacity, habit and science– are accidents. They inhere or ‘happen’ to human beings. Thus, they do not happen in isolation. That is why the economic aspect of an action is merged with other aspects –cultural, historical, geographical, singular– pertaining to the acting substance (i.e. the person, the society, and the environment). Within the human realm all these aspects mutually influence each other following a dynamic process: one aspect cannot be completely isolated from the others.

Second, if ‘the economic’ were a contingent accident we should be immersed in a completely unmanageable realm. Instead, the economic, as defined by Aristotle, is a necessary human condition: they all need to use things to live and they are all called on to live well. For Aristotle man is not only zoôn politikon but also zoôn oikonomikon. To be economic is necessary for man. Therefore, this is an appropriate subject-matter for science. However, the specific way of satisfying the individuals’ needs is left to their choice or taste; i.e., it is not a priori determined.

37 Nicomachean Ethics VI, 5, 1140b 2.
38 Cf. Categories VIII, 8b 29-33.
39 E.g. Politics, I, 2, 1253a 3-4.
40 Eudemian Ethics, VII, 10, 1242a 22-3.
Third, this accidental subject matter of the economic practical science entails a kind of “living science”, where the principles are few and most of the scientific conclusions are variable according to the cases. 41

Finally, given the previous conclusions, there are several reasons why institutions matter greatly in the economic realm. Institutions both embody and reinforce steady habits. That is, there are two directions of analysis: on the one hand, how habits shape institutions, and on the other, how institutions encourage habits. Concerning the first direction, habits, especially good habits, make actions more predictable, and thus facilitate the consolidation of institutions. In the other way, institutions foster habits, for they reinforce the realisation of determined acts through rewards and punishments. According to Aristotle, the main means of fostering these actions are education and law. Firstly, education, in the broad Greek sense of paideia, is the shaping of personal character. This is why “it makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth.”42 Secondly, law bears a pedagogical objective.43 Aristotle understands that a set of concrete virtues leads humans to their natural excellence. This process begins with the education of those virtues, conveniently consolidated by laws.

There are two reasons why this presence of institutions is relevant. Firstly, they are relevant for the very possibility of economic science. As explained, practical sciences (and Economics within them) may make generalizations and predictions thanks to the repetition of acts. Institutions help in the consolidation of habits. Secondly, predictability and institutions facilitate

42 Nicomachean Ethics, II, 1, 1103b 24.
economic coordination. Coordination is possible when acts are foreseeable. Thus we can conclude, in an Aristotelian minded spirit, that economic coordination is more easily achievable and economic science can more accurately postulate generalizations within a highly institutionalized environment.

Arduous as it may seem, this explanation of oikonomikè will be more than useful if we intend to extract the greatest possible profit from Aristotle’s conception. Let us proceed to some ethical, political and epistemological consequences of this ontological analysis.

2. Ethical consequences of Aristotle’s oikonomikè

I have contended that one of the meanings of ‘the economic’ is a habit. Given that ‘the economic’ action is oriented towards the good, ‘the economic’ as a habit is a virtuous habit, i.e., economic prudence. In fact, however, there is a constellation of virtues that helps to perform suitable economic actions. Although Aristotle does not explicitly establish all the developments of this article, they can be regarded as Aristotelian.

First, oikonomikè requires temperance. “How can the ruler rule properly, or the subject be properly ruled, unless they are both temperate and just (sóphron kai dikaios)?” Aristotle asks.44 I have stated that Aristotle distinguished between two kinds of chrematistics: the one subordinated to oikonomikè, limited and natural, and the other unnatural and not subordinated to oikonomikè. Both forms of chrematistics use money as an instrument. What happens is that the instrument and the means are often confused, due to their unlimited (ápeiron) desire (epithumías), and thus they look unlimitedly for money.45 This mistaken kind of chrematistics infects other behaviours, leading to the use of

“each and every capacity in a way non consonant with its nature. The proper function of courage, for example, is not to produce money but to give confidence. The same is true of military and medical ability: neither has the function

44 Politics I, 13, 1259b 39-40).
45 Cf. Politics I, 8, 1258a 1).
of producing money: the one has the function of producing victory, and the other that of producing health. But those of whom we are speaking turn all such capacities into forms of the art of acquisition, as though to make money were the one aim and everything else must contribute to that aim.”

This sounds really contemporary. The medicine to cure the unlimited appetite is precisely virtue or, more specifically, temperance. This interpretation of Aristotle is more coincident to William Kern’s view than to Stephen Pack’s. While Kern considers that unnatural chrematistics stem from unlimited desires, Pack thinks the other way round: money and unnatural chrematistics cause unlimited desires. My argument in support of Kern’s interpretation is that it is literally borne by Aristotle: “as their desires are unlimited, they also desire the means of gratifying them should be without limit.”

Second, oikonomikè also requires prudence and justice. Let us put forth an example provided by Aristotle. He analysed the functioning of the market in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (V, 5). He concluded that the tenet ruling demand, and therefore prices and wages, is *chreia*, which means economic need. Chreia is subjective and intrinsically moral. It is subjective because each person judges what is necessary for himself. There is another Greek term for necessity, *anagke*, also used by Aristotle in other contexts. Anagke is strict necessity (as, for example, it is necessary that an effect has one or more causes). However, chreia is relative necessity: in order to survive, it is necessary to eat, but one may eat one thing or another, according to any timetable, and so on. Referring to oikonomikè, chreia means that the way

46 *Politics* I, 9, 1258a 6-14).
49 *Politics* I, 9, 1258a 1-2.
of using necessities is not determined \textit{a priori}, but it is up to each one’s will, with an eye on the end to be achieved. These developments on economic exchange belong to Aristotle’s writing about Justice (\textit{Nicomachean Ethics} V) and are a typical example of practical reasoning. What virtues are needed in this process? First, prudence or practical wisdom –an intellectual and ethical virtue– in order to accurately assess the real situation and the real necessity of the things demanded: the suitable \textit{chreia}. Second, Justice which helps to act as indicated by prudence. If market relations are regulated by justice there are no commercial vices. People who are strongly committed to justice are not free-riders.

Third, \textit{oikonomikè} needs continence, a virtue related to fortitude. According to Aristotle, the reason we need \textit{oikonomikè} is that “it is impossible to live well, or indeed to live at all, unless the necessary conditions are present,”\textsuperscript{50} and “it is therefore the greatest of blessings for a state that its members should possess a moderate and adequate fortune.”\textsuperscript{51} Happiness is an activity conforming to virtue, and “still, happiness, [...] needs external goods as well. For it is impossible or at least not easy to perform noble actions if one lacks the wherewithal.”\textsuperscript{52} Then, though not expressly stated by Aristotle, chrematistics and economic action should assure that everybody succeeds in possessing what they need to achieve the \textit{Good Life}. This goal has various aspects in which the virtues previously mentioned collaborate in easing coordination. This is another aspect of the economic life that calls for continence. One of the problems of economics is that of facing uncertainty. In this sense, continence contributes to making future affairs more predictable. There are higher chances of habits begetting stable behaviour when they are morally good (virtues). According to Aristotle, the incontinent person is unpredictable, while the continent one is more predictable because he or she perseveres: “A morally weak person does not

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Politics} I, 4, 1253b 25.  
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Politics} IV, 11, 1296a 1.  
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} I, 8, 1099a 31-3.
abide by the dictates of reason.53 A morally strong person remains more steadfast and a morally weak person less steadfast than the capacity of most men permits."54

Thus, the probability of economic coordination is greater among virtuous people for their stable character and conduct can be foreseen. Coordination is easier within a group of people who possess an ethical commitment and a common ethos.

Virtues foster the economic process in other ways. Aristotle devoted the largest part of his Nicomachean Ethics (Books VIII and IX) to friendship. This virtue, site of social cohesion, supplements justice. In fact, justice is not necessary among friends. Liberality or generosity (Book IV, 1) also help to overcome the problems of disequilibrium, through individual or collective action. In an imperfect world, virtues help reduce error and act as a balm. They foster coordination and reduce problems during coordination adjustments.

To summarize, I propose that an Aristotelian conception teaches that we must take more care in promoting the development of personal virtues than in building perfect systems.55 As

54 Nicomachean Ethics VII, 10, 1152a 26-7.
55 It could be appropriate to add a few words about the gender perspective in this section. In her introduction to Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, Cynthia Freeland (ed., Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1993, p. 15) asserts: “it is no longer acceptable to read Aristotle’s works while ignoring issues of gender.” Aristotle has been criticized for relegating women to a secondary position, specifically to the area of the household, because of his patriarchal bias. For him, man’s virtue is to command and woman’s virtue entails obeying (Politics I, 13, 1260a 23-4). However, it has been highlighted, in Aristotle’s defence, that he considers man and woman to have the same essence, to be specifically equal (cf. Marguerite Deslauriers, “Sex and Essence in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Biology”, in C. Freeland (ed), pp. 138-67, 1993, p. 139) and to both be citizens (Politics I, 13, 1260b 19; II, 9, 1269b15) oriented towards the ends of life (Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 12, 1162a 21-2). The differences between men and women remarked on by Aristotle lie in their functions (erga) in the house (Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 12, 1162a 22) – in other words, a gender division of labour. For some authors, they stem from ‘an unreflective belief’ (Deslauriers, op.cit., p. 159)
an accident, the best we can do to perform the economic action is to consolidate it by virtues. This lesson calls for returning to a greater emphasis on education in virtues and on observance of law, which are the two Aristotelian means to foster virtue. This should be an important aspect of economic policy in an Aristotelian spirit.

3. Political and economic policy consequences

Aristotle was neither a political economist nor did he develop concrete policy proposals at length. However, in this section general lessons and meaningful criteria relevant to this field are presented by means of a combination of his more general teachings.

Virtues, for Aristotle, are always political: they can only be developed and consolidated within the interaction of communi-
ty. Thus oikonomikè as virtue is embedded in a political environment. Coordination would be guaranteed if, first, there is a set of socially recognized values and, second, of the individual actions are aimed at these ends. Prudence helps to perform these. The knowledge of these shared social values is a matter of Politics, the most architectonical Aristotelian practical science.

Let me further explore this issue beginning with the Aristotelian concept of civil society. “The polis,” he says, “is an association (koinonía) of freemen”. For him, the polis is a unity of families. What kind of entity is a unity of families? Ontologically, the Aristotelian polis is an order – a quality – of relationships between human actions, i.e., an ordered relation (a prós tì). The order is given by the fact that these actions aim at a common goal, a shared thought and intention of those people. The foundation of this order of relations between families that constitutes a polis is the orientation of their actions towards an end:

“It is clear, therefore, that a polis is not an association for residence on a common site, or for the sake of preventing mutual injustice and easing exchange. These are indeed conditions which must be present before a polis can exist; but the existence of all these conditions is not enough, in itself, to constitute a polis. What constitutes a polis is an association of households and clans in a good life (eû zên), for the sake of attaining a perfect and self-sufficing existence (autárkous).”

That is, exchange and the consequent possibility of possessing the goods that are necessary when looking for a Good Life, is a condition of a polis. In this way, the end of the polis subsumes the end of oikonomikè as action. For Aristotle, Politics as the practice and science of Good Life is itself morality, and


58 Politics III, 9, 1280b 29-35.
oikonomikè is an action and science subordinated to it. At the same time, however, oikonomikè is a condition of society’s unity. Aristotle’s autarky is not an economic concept; it does not essentially mean economic independence, but the possibility of self-sufficiently achieving a Good or fulfilled Life: autarky is happiness. However, personal and political autarchy has also material components only achievable through interaction. As a consequence which is not explicitly formulated by Aristotle, the exchange interaction cannot work well outside political society without falling into “censured chrematistics”. Good functioning of market does not develop in a vacuum but in political society. This approach resembles current positions about the necessity of moral ties to ensure a correct performance of the market. It also assumes that the economy is a social reality.


62 Finnis says: “Things will be better for everyone if there is a division of labour between families, specialization, technology, joint of co-operative enterprises in production and marketing, a market and a medium of exchange, in short, an economy that is more than domestic” (Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 145). Gudeman sees the relationship between people as mediated by things as the
Ontologically, the market seems also to be an accidental reality, a net or order of relations – of buyers and sellers, people who exchange. The order or unity comes from the coincidence of wills willing to buy or sell in order to satisfy their needs and this coincidence is facilitated by prices.

For Aristotle, both society and exchange are natural in the sense that they are institutions demanded by human nature to achieve its natural fulfilment. As remarked, for Aristotle men are both zoôn politikôn and zoôn oikonomikôn. However, for him the natural in the human realm is not merely ‘spontaneous’ or ‘automatic’. Polis and exchange are tasks that are to be performed with effort, not facts. This does not mean that some institutions cannot arise that facilitate this performance and work quite automatically. Precisely, the task of Politics and Economics is to find out and to shape these institutions which foster the suitable habits dealing with economic coordination. In any case, as previously stated, provided that one goal of these institutions is to shape habits, the very institutions are like empty structures to be filled. This goal highlights the relevance of paying special attention to their efficacy in promoting good habits (virtues). This is one important political lesson from the Aristotelian conception of oikonomikè and politikè.

Another lesson, more specific for economic policy, has to do with the involvement with ends. In the Aristotelian conception of oikonomikè ends are not given (as in standard economics), but really matter: they are the goal of oikonomikè and cannot be avoided. The problem which arises in dealing with ends is incommensurability. Often, in the realm of ends there is not a common measure allowing a precise calculation of the optimal selection. Aristotle argues against Plato’s monistic conception of the good: “of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one stuff of economy (cf. op. cit., p. 147).

63 As Finnis also asserts “now such relationships in part are, and in part are not, the outcome of human intelligence, practical reasonableness, and effort” (1980, op. cit., 136).
Idea”.64 This may be solved by practical wisdom and practical science but may not be solved technically. There is a kind of “practical comparability” that enables decisions in fields where calculus does not apply. In this area, economists, although enlightened by calculations, should make the final decision on prudential grounds.65 The benefits of some decisions of political economy cannot be calculated since they are intangible and incommensurable. For example, the so-called “second generation reforms” are highly relevant, independently of their low or uncertain return rate.

This problem does not arise in the technical field. This domain can be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. Even though some ends are priceless –goodness, beauty, friendship–, some others may be priced and made commensurate through prices. Aristotle himself did it: “things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable. It is for this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes in a sense an intermediate; for it measures all things, and therefore the excess and the defect –how many shoes are equal to a house.”66 Aristotle then highlights that money is the representative of demand (chreia) through price. A tension however remains: “Now in truth it is


66 Nicomachean Ethics, V, 5, 1133a 20ff.
impossible that things differing so much should become commensurate, but with reference to demand they may become so sufficiently.”67 in order to exchange them, we may add. This is certainly possible, but when different priceless goods are in

67 Nicomachean Ethics V, 5, 1133b 1-3. I do not agree with S. Meikle’s interpretation (op. cit., 39) which follows the Marxian. Marx quotes Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in this passage: “neither would there have been association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability” (οὐτ ισότεσσ μ ὀψεσ συμμετρασ). Here, however, he [Aristotle] comes to a stop, and gives up the further analysis of the form of value. “It is, however, in reality, impossible (τε μεν ον αλετηεαι αδηνατον), that such unlike things can be commensurable” – i.e., qualitatively equal. Such an equalisation can only be something foreign to their real nature, consequently only “a makeshift for practical purposes.” (The Capital I, 1, 3, 3, retrieved August 20 2008, from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S1. That is, Marx considers that Aristotle would have weakly conceded what he ought not to concede. The mistake arises from an imperfect translation. Marx put into brackets the Greek version of the part of the passage well translated. But he does not do it with the last part, which is incorrectly translated. Aristotel did not say “a makeshift for practical purposes”, rather “but with reference to demand they may become so sufficiently” (προς δὲ τὴν χρειαν ενδέχεται ικανός: V, 5, 1133b 31). In this way, both Marx and Meikle rely on Aristotle to maintain an intrinsic problem of the exchange system that necessarily leads to a practice of the censured chrematistics. According to Aristotle, the reason why this chrematistics arises is not the exchange value but the unlimited desire. If things exchanged are qualitatively different and incommensurable, what is, according to Aristotle, the unit of analysis or commonalty that enables things to be compared? It is the necessity (χρεια) of the goods exchanged for the demander. Although in many passages of the Metaphysics and Physics Aristotle claims that measurement requires homogeneity, in the Categories he considers the possibility of measure and commensurate qualities by degrees (see, e.g., VIII, 10b 26). The resulting commensuration between the things so measured, he warns, has limits and is conventional (see, e.g., VI, 5b 11 and 8, 10b 13). Thus, it can be applied – with limits – to things exchanged through necessity. Instead, it cannot be applied to different ends because ends differ in more than degrees of quality. The difference between ends is analogical, of “priority and posteriority” (πρότερον και ύστερον), and cannot be measured for there is not a common measure (see, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics I, 6, 1096b 18-25).
play commensuration becomes impossible. In these cases strict formal schemes ought to be broken and decisions taken with a higher risk or inexactly.

4. Epistemological lessons

At this stage we should be convinced that from an Aristotelian point of view economic science is a practical science that may originate generalisations relying on tendencies. These generalisations cannot be exact because tendencies may fail due to the contingency and singularity of the human realm. We may face unforeseeable reactions by free human beings to known facts, unforeseeable facts that cause foreseeable or non-human reactions. The essentials are only a few and thus we are in an accidental realm which is often unpredictable. As already explained, the way of providing security is by strengthening habits. Trustworthy institutions, social and political stability, and personal virtues (which are at the root of the former elements) are highly relevant for a thorough economic analysis. Consequently, ethics and politics matter. Economic analysis cannot be developed in a social or personal vacuum.

Coming back to epistemology, all the characteristics of practical science should be taken into account: inexactness, practical aim, closeness to reality, normativeness and a methodological pluralism. These characteristics suppose a quite different economic science; such new science is submerged in ethics and politics. This does not mean that rigorousness is left out when the nature of the decision enables a cost-benefit analysis. This technical analysis will however remain under the umbrella of practical science. Let us briefly review those characteristics of practical science. First, inexactness. He asserts in the Nicomachean Ethics:

“Our treatment discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions (…). Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, exhibit much variety and fluctuation (...). We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such
premises to indicate the truth *roughly and in outline.*”

Aristotle identifies two reasons for this ‘inexactness’ of practical sciences: “variety and fluctuation” of actions. That is, there are lots of possible different situations and the human being may change his decisions. This is why for Aristotle human action is always singular. He says:

“We must, however, not only make this general statement, but also apply it to the individual facts. For among statements about conduct those which are general apply more widely, but those which are particular are more true, since conduct has to do with individual cases, and our statements must harmonize with the facts in these cases.”

And also,

“(…) actions are in the class of particulars, and the particular acts here are voluntary. What sort of things are to be chosen, and in return for what, it is not easy to state; for there are many differences in the particular cases.”

Aristotle often compares Politics with medicine in this respect, as in the next quotation:

“matters concerned with conduct and questions about what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or set of precept, but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.”

Second, practical science must be closely linked to the concrete case. “Now no doubt,” Aristotle says, “it is proper to start from the known. However, ‘the known’ has two meanings -‘what is known to us,’ which is one thing, and ‘what is

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69 *Nicomachean Ethics* II, 7, 1107a 31-3, emphasis added.
70 *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 1, 1110b 6-8, emphasis added.
71 *Nicomachean Ethics* II, 2, 1104a 4-9.
knowable in itself,’ which is another. Perhaps, then, for us at all events, it is proper to start from what is known to us.””\textsuperscript{72} That is, we must start from the facts manifest on the surface to discover the causes.

Third, another distinctive feature of practical sciences is their pragmatic end. Aristotle states that “the end of this kind of study [Politics] is not knowledge but action,”\textsuperscript{73} and that “we are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good.”\textsuperscript{74} He adds in his \textit{Metaphysics} that “the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action.”\textsuperscript{75} Nowadays, social sciences are theoretical studies of practical subjects. Then one can ask: what is their epistemological condition? Aquinas completes Aristotle on this point: he distinguishes three principles to decide whether a science is theoretical or practical. These are the subject-matter, the end and the method. This threefold classification leaves room for “mixed” cases, as those theoretical studies of practical subjects just mentioned above. Aquinas asserts in \textit{De Veritate}:

\begin{quote}
“Knowledge is said to be practical by its order to act. This can happen in two ways. Sometimes \textit{in actu}, i. e., when it is actually ordered to perform something (...) Other times, when knowledge can be ordered to act but it is not now ordered to act (...); in this way knowledge is virtually practical, but not \textit{in actu}.”\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

This is an important point because current social sciences, although they may try to be only theoretical, are virtually ordered towards action. Thus, although a particular science may be theoretical \textit{secundum finem}, or may have both theoretical and practical aspects, its implicit orientation towards action determines its epistemological framework.

\textsuperscript{72} Nicomachean Ethics I, 4, 1095b 2-4.
\textsuperscript{73} Nicomachean Ethics I, 3, 1095a 6.
\textsuperscript{74} Nicomachean Ethics II, 2 1103b 27-28.
\textsuperscript{75} Metaphysics II, 1, 993b 21-22.
\textsuperscript{76} Aquinas, \textit{De Veritate}, in Quaestiones Disputatae I, Torino-Rome, Marietti, 1949, q. 3, a. 3.
The fourth characteristic of practical sciences is normativeness. Inexactness, closeness to reality and pragmatic aim are features of the practical sciences stemming from the singularity of human action, as conceived by Aristotle. Besides, the normative character of practical sciences is linked to their pragmatic aim. The statement that “it is rational to act in a concrete way” is both a “positive” and normative statement.

Finally, a reference should be made to the methodological devices characteristic of practical sciences. The abundant bibliography on this topic could be summarized as a proposal of methodological plurality. In his *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle admirably combines axiomatic deduction, inductive inference, dialectic arguments, rhetoric, imagination, examples, and topics.

These characteristics of practical sciences indicate that their conclusions are not rigid but are rather variable.

5. Some conclusions

From the apparently outdated passages of Aristotle on *oi-konomikè* I have selected and separated what is old-fashioned from what is valid today. From these last elements—which may be abridged in the intrinsic ethical and political character of economics— we can extract useful lessons. These lessons refer to the impact of Ethics and Politics on Economics. They stress the relevance of personal virtues and institutions for a suitable functioning of the economy. From an epistemological perspective, these lessons highlight the inexact character of Economics and the necessity of firm reliance on data. The concern with ends may lead to prudential, not technical, analysis and decisions. This calls for broadening the scope of Economics and consequently should provoke changes in its teaching. Summing up, a closer attention to Aristotle would have a high impact on current economy and Economics.
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